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As the world
becomes
increasingly
focused on
Iran’s nuclear
activities, we
are once again
looking to our
intelligence to
determine what
those activities
mean.
Clearly, we have
a problem on our
hands when it
comes to Iran.
There is no
question that
the nuclear
capabilities
Iran is trying
to develop are
“dual use” –
they could be
used to produce
electrical power
or nuclear
weapons
material.
The Intelligence
Community
confronts this
“dual use”
dilemma every
day, and it is
precisely why we
need good
intelligence on
Iran. When there
is more than one
plausible
explanation for
an action, good
intelligence is
essential for
determining the
plans and
intentions of
those that could
threaten our
national
security.
In light of
Iran’s past
actions,
particularly
their
indisputable
support of
terrorism that
has taken
American lives,
I am not
inclined to give
them the benefit
of the doubt on
these dual use
nuclear
activities. As
some might
recall, in early
2003, as we
faced the
prospect of war
in Iraq, most of
us weren’t
inclined to give
Saddam the
benefit of the
doubt on his
dual use
activity either.
That’s why we
depend on the
Intelligence
Community to
help us see
through our
biases to get at
the facts to
help us separate
what we know
from what we
think.
I would like to
say that the
Intelligence
Community has
its act together
in regards to
our intelligence
assessments
about Iran’s
nuclear
activities. But
the fact is, I
am concerned.
The Senate
Intelligence
Committee’s Iraq
investigation
revealed that
Intelligence
Community
analysts failed
to explain the
difference
between what
they knew, what
they didn’t
know, and what
they thought
about Iraq
weapons of mass
destruction. We
can’t afford to
make those same
mistakes on
Iran.
I have directed
the staff of the
Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence to
apply the
lessons we
learned in our
Iraq review to
the intelligence
on Iran’s
nuclear
activities. We,
as policymakers,
must be more
proactive in
evaluating and
analyzing all
the intelligence
we receive on
this threat and
others.
Unfortunately,
some members of
the Committee,
and of the
Senate, are more
focused on
intelligence
failures of the
past.
We all know the
intelligence on
Iraq was wrong.
We know the
mistakes that
were made. The
Committee
continues to
look at the Iraq
intelligence,
but it is time
to move on. My
colleagues
across the aisle
on the Committee
and in the
Congress want to
continue
looking at the
past in an
attempt to blame
policymakers for
decisions they
made based upon
the bad
intelligence
they received.
As a result, we
have not made
progress on our
oversight of
critical Iran
intelligence.
I intend to
complete the
ongoing Phase
Two inquiry
(which includes
the review of
statements
regarding Iraq
made by public
officials four
or five years
ago based on bad
intelligence) in
a timely manner
and within the
agreed upon
scope and turn
the Committee’s
attention to
other pressing
national
security matters
such as Iran. We
will then be
able to bring
more of the
Committee’s
assets to bear
on questions
surrounding Iran
and its nuclear
activities.
The Intelligence
Community has
had a
significant
increase in
funding since
9/11. The
question now is
less a matter of
resources.
Rather, it is a
matter of having
thorough
analysis that is
honest about
uncertainties.
We need more
aggressive
collection that
works to reduce
those
uncertainties.
We must make
sure we have
both with regard
to Iran’s
nuclear plans
and intentions.
RF
Pat Roberts
is the U.S.
Senator from
Kansas and is
the Chairman of
the Select
Committee on
Intelligence. |
