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I believe that
America – this
time with her
international
partners –
should go back
to the moon.
I am
disappointed
that we left
thirty years
ago. I am
thrilled when I
watch movies
like “Apollo 13”
and “The Dish.”
I think that
lunar
exploration
would be
wonderful for
national
prestige and
that it would
teach us a great
deal about the
techniques
needed to
explore Mars.
Any nation that
has a research
station at the
Antarctic South
Pole ought to
have one on the
moon. I want
Americans to be
on the Moon to
greet the
Chinese when
they arrive.
Having said all
of that, I have
to state my
belief that the
National
Aeronautics and
Space
Administration
(NASA) is not
ready to take us
there.
One could easily
reply that NASA
was not ready to
fly to the moon
in 1961 when
President John
F. Kennedy made
his famous
commitment. We
had yet to orbit
John Glenn,
build the Saturn
V rocket, and
master lunar
orbit
rendezvous.
Indeed, the
organization
that placed Neil
Armstrong and
Buzz Aldrin on
the moon in 1969
was not the same
NASA that
received
President
Kennedy’s
mandate in 1961.
It was bigger,
richer, smarter,
and twice
reorganized to
engage the
complexities of
lunar flight.
In similar ways,
it needs to be
revitalized
again.
Today NASA’s
budget is
essentially
fixed at about
$17 billion per
year, with
adjustments for
inflation. Much
of that budget
is committed to
projects other
than going to
the moon. The
fiscal
constraints
placed on the
new lunar effort
are as demanding
– some would say
more severe –
than the time
deadline imposed
by President
Kennedy in 1961.
Getting
Armstrong and
Aldrin to the
moon and back
cost $21.4
billion in the
currency of its
day. That is
the equivalent,
adjusting for
inflation, of
about $150
billion today.
Since NASA will
not need to
reinvent every
wheel and
rebuild its
field centers,
the next voyage
will not cost as
much as the
first. Some say
that NASA could
return for as
little as 50
percent of the
initial
expedition. Yet
finding $75
billion or more
in an agency on
a fixed budget
will be a
substantial
challenge.
NASA could do it
for less. The
six missions
that followed
Apollo 11 each
cost the
equivalent of
about $4 billion
in today’s
dollars. Once
NASA and its
contractors
learned how to
put the first
humans on the
Moon, subsequent
missions were
cheaper. It also
helped that a
lot of hardware
acquired for
Apollo 11 was
left over when
the astronauts
returned home.
Still, even at
$4 billion per
landing, NASA
could not expect
to make more
than one or two
visits per year
with all of its
other current
commitments.
Additionally,
this assumes
that NASA uses
Apollo-style
technology or
what some have
called “Apollo
on steroids.”
Apollo
technology,
however, will
never get us to
Mars. Cost
estimates for a
mission to Mars
using
Apollo-style
propulsion and
spacecraft
methods range
from $500
billion to $1
trillion.
The whole Space
Exploration
Vision – which
includes new
rockets, new
spacecraft,
lunar voyages,
and preparations
for Mars – is
premised on the
myth of what is
referred to as
the “wedge.” It
presumes that
NASA can conjure
up new funds by
closing old
programs. The
space shuttle,
at $5 billion
per year, and
the
international
space station
are certainly
tempting targets
for this
philosophy.
Yet we have
heard this story
before. In the
early 1980s,
after NASA
executives
convinced
President Ronald
Reagan to
declare the
space shuttle
“fully
operational,”
they argued that
an international
space station
could be
financed with
funds freed up
by ending the
shuttle
development
effort.
Then-NASA
Administrator
Dan Goldin tried
to pay for the
X-33 – one of
many efforts to
replace the
space shuttle –
by freezing
shuttle upgrades
and reducing the
shuttle
workforce. It
didn’t work then
and it is
unlikely to work
now.
NASA needs to
invest in new
rocket
technologies,
like nuclear
propulsion. It
needs to invest
in new types of
spacecraft. It
needs to invest
in missions such
as the effort to
locate
earth-like
planets around
neighboring
stars, which
holds enormous
promise as a
means of
exciting
long-term
interest in
space
exploration.
NASA needs to
hire the next
great generation
of space flight
engineers and
revitalize its
in-house
technical
capability. It
needs to learn
how to conduct
low-cost space
flight missions
for humans, as
it has already
done in the
robotics field,
and as
entrepreneurs
like Burt Rutan
are trying to do
now.
These are
painstaking
necessities,
ones likely to
delay an
Apollo-style
return to the
Moon. I am sorry
that this is the
case, because,
as indicated, I
want to go back
to the Moon,
too. But there
are many things
I want and only
a few that I can
have. On
reflection, I
think it would
be better to
have a sustained
space
exploration
effort supported
by new, low-cost
technologies and
a smart NASA
rather than a
focused effort
to return to the
Moon.
RF
Howard E.
McCurdy is
professor of
public affairs
at American
University, and
the author of
six books on the
U.S. space
program,
including Space
and the American
Imagination and
Faster Better
Cheaper: Low
Cost Innovation
in the U.S.
Space Program. |
